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The Transformation Rule Under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the consumer debt in the United States arises from the 
purchase of household goods. 1 Commonly, a seller extending credit or 
a lender advancing money for these purchases retains a security inter-
est in the goods until the debt is repaid.2 This security interest gives 
the creditor the right to repossess the goods should the debtor default 
on the loan. 3 
Consumer debt is often refinanced to bring a delinquent account 
current or to consolidate a prior loan with a new advance.4 Typically, 
the debtor requests either a new advance of money or an extension of 
time for repayment of an existing note. In either event, the creditor 
issues a new note whose balance includes the previous obligation. 5 
The security interest taken by a seller or lender in ordinary house-
hold goods is called a "purchase money security interest,"6 and is ac-
corded special treatment in several circumstances by the Uniform 
1. The amount of consumer credit extended for the purchase of general consumer durable 
goods is second only to the amount advanced for the purchase of automobiles, mobile homes, 
boats, aircraft and recreational vehicles. CoNSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON CoNSUMER FINANCE 123 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
NCCF REPORT]. About 40% of consumers purchasing durable goods do so on credit. T. DUR-
KIN & G. ELLIEHAUSEN, 1977 CoNSUMER CREDIT SURVEY 73 (1978) [Federal-Reserve-spon-
sored study, hereinafter cited as FEDERAL REsERVE STUDY]. See generally R. COLE, 
CoNSUMER AND CoMMERCIAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT 42, 101 (7th ed. 1984). 
2. The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] defines a security interest as 
"an interest in personal property ... which secures payment or performance of an obligation." 
U.C.C. § 1-201(38) (1985). The Bankruptcy Code definition is almost identical. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 101(28), 101(37) (1982) ("lien" means a charge against or interest in property to secure pay-
ment of a debt; "security interest" means a lien created by agreement). 
3. U.C.C. § 9-503 provides that a secured party "has on default the right to take possession 
of the collateral." One survey indicates that "creditors [think] the single most important remedy 
or contract provision in a secured consumer credit transaction [is] the right to take a security 
interest in the goods (use the goods as collateral for the transaction) and the concomitant right to 
repossess if the debtor default[s]." NCCF REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
4. Refinancing is defined as the "discharge of an obligation with funds acquired through the 
creation of a new debt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (5th ed. 1979). One court has de-
scribed the possible variations of refinancing: 
[T]he process involves an existing note that is "paid by renewal" or "flipped." The "new" 
or renewed note incorporates the balance still owing on the old note. Sometimes the re-
newal note merely extends the time of payment for the amount due on the old note. Other 
times a number of old notes are "consolidated" into one "new" note. Another practice is to 
renew an old note and give an additional cash advance in the renewal note, sometimes tak-
ing an additional security interest in new or different collateral. 
In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 262 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
5. In one court's words, "[t]he outstanding balance on the first note is, on paper at least, paid 
off with funds from the second note." In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454, 459 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). 
6. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1985) defines a "purchase money security interest" as follows: 
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Commercial Code (U.C.C.).7 When a debt secured by a purchase 
money security interest is refinanced, however, the traditional view 
taken by the bankruptcy courts has been that the lender's purchase 
money interest is transformed, becoming nonpurchase money in char-
acter. 8 This view is known as the "transformation rule."9 
The purchase money /non purchase money distinction gained new 
significance in 1978 when Congress enacted a comprehensive reform 
of the Bankruptcy Code.10 In a major break with prior law, section 
522 of the new Code sets forth exemption-and-avoidance provisions11 
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to 
enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used. 
7. Official comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-107 lists some instances in which purchase money obli· 
gations take priority over other obligations. For present purposes, the most important attribute 
of purchase money status under the U.C.C. is that public filing of a financing statement is unnec-
essary to perfect a purchase money interest in consumer goods. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1985). An 
unperfected or tardily perfected security interest is not enforceable in bankruptcy. See note 18 
infra and accompanying text. 
Recently, scholars have questioned the favorable treatment afforded the claims of secured 
creditors under both bankruptcy law and the U.C.C. Compare White, Efficiency Justifications 
far Personal Property Security, 31 V AND. L. REV. 473 (1984) (security is economically efficient) 
with Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) (favored 
treatment of secured debt is without justification). 
8. See, e.g., In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that "issuance of 
a new loan extinguishes the purchase money character of the security interest"); In re Manuel, 
507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Rosen, 17 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re Jones, 5 
Bankr. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980). The cases are collected in Note, Section 522(./): A Proposal 
far the Survival of Purchase Money Security Interests Following Refinancing, 18 TULSA L.J. 280 
n.2 (1982). See also Butler, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(./) in the District of South Caro· 
/ina, 35 S.C. L. REV. 311, 323-30 (1984). 
9. See In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699, 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 
270, 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). 
The term "transformation rule" is also used to describe the view that purchase money status 
in collateral is lost entirely if the collateral acts as security for any debt other than its purchase 
price, as it does under retail credit arrangements providing that earlier-purchased items are not 
freed from the security agreement when paid for, but remain as collateral for later-purchased 
items. 
This Note is limited to the question of whether a purchase money security interest is auto-
matically transformed into a nonpurchase money security interest upon refinancing. It assumes 
that purchase money status is not lost if the collateral acts as security for more than its purchase 
price. If the alternative view were adopted, most refinancings would be subject to transformation 
whether or not the refinancing was held to automatically transform purchase money status, be· 
cause after refinancing the collateral secures additional interest charges, a new cash advance, or 
other consolidated debts. See generally McLaughlin, "Add-On" Clauses in Equipment Purchase 
Money Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (1981). 
In adopting the version of the rule described in this Note, the Ninth Circuit failed to reach 
the issue of collateral securing more than its own price, but implied that it does not favor that 
formulation of the rule. In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The weight of 
authority appears to be against the debtors on this point."). 
10. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11 & 28 U.S.C.). 
11. The provisions are found in 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). One bankruptcy judge has written: 
The [1978] Code's grant to the debtor of avoiding powers on exempt property rivals the 
uniform [federal] exemption scheme of§ 522(d) in importance .... The avoiding powers 
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that enable a debtor undergoing bankruptcy to retain certain types of 
exempt property subject to otherwise valid nonpossessory,12 nonpur-
chase money security interests.13 Because only nonpurchase money se-
curity interests may be avoided, whether a refinanced purchase money 
security interest is "transformed" into a nonpurchase money security 
interest determines whether the debtor is allowed to keep the secured 
property. 
Most bankruptcy courts faced with refinanced purchase money se-
curity interests under section 522 of the new Bankruptcy Code14 have 
set out in the Code . . . go far beyond whatever powers the bankrupt had under the old law 
in concept and even farther in application. 
Hughes, Code Exemptions: Far Reaching Achievement, 28 DE PAULL. REV. 1025, 1036-37 
(1979). 
12. A possessory security interest is one in which the creditor takes physical possession of the 
collateral. The pawnshop is the classic example of such an arrangement. See J. WHITE & R. 
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 23-10, at 
933-34 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. 
13. Section 522(b) allows the debtor to exempt property from his estate in bankruptcy, and 
allows debtors to choose between federal and state exempt-property lists unless the state opts out 
of this arrangement. Section 522(d) sets out the federal exemptions. Section 522(f) provides: 
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an 
interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which 
the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is -
1) a judicial lien; or 
2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any - . 
A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, 'books, ani-
mals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, 
or household use of the debtor or a dependant of the debtor; 
B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a 
dependant of the debtor; or 
C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependant of the debtor. 
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982) (emphasis added). 
In states that have "opted out" of the federal exemption scheme under§ 522(b), debtors may 
still use § 522(f) to avoid liens on property exempt under state law. See Comment, Protection of 
a Debtor's ''Fresh Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 843, 860 n.142 
(1980). The following states have enacted legislation displacing the federal exemptions: Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia 
and Wyoming. 3 W. CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 522.02 n.4a (15th ed. 1985). 
The 1978 Act was amended in 1984 in response to the sudden increase in bankruptcy filings 
that followed the 1978 Act. See note 137 infra. The general effect of the 1984 amendments was 
to make it more difficult for individuals to qualify for relief, and to extend the rights of creditors, 
including unsecured creditors. The change most directly relevant to this discussion is the imposi-
tion of a $4000 aggregate limit on the household property that may be exempted under § 522. 
See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 306(b), 
98 Stat. 333, 353 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3)). The 1984 changes are surveyed in Chatz & 
Schumm, 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments-Freshfrom the Anvil, 89 COM. L.J. 317 (1984); 
Snider, Rochkind, Green, Stein & Welford, The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984, 63 MICH. B.J. 775 (1984). 
14. Bankruptcy courts must apply state law in determining whether or not a purchase money 
security interest retains its purchase money character after refinancing. Once the status of the 
security interest is determined, federal law dictates whether or not the interest will be enforceable 
in bankruptcy. See Lewis v. Manufacturers Natl. Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961) (state law deter-
mines status of creditor's claims; bankruptcy court then applies federal bankruptcy law to deter-
mine which claims may be avoided). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 
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applied the transformation rule15 and thus have allowed debtors to 
avoid the liens on their exempt property. Recently, however, several 
bankruptcy courts have rejected the transformation rule as formalistic 
and contrary to the policies of the Bankruptcy Code.16 These courts 
have held that refinancing does not automatically extinguish the 
purchase money character of a security interest and so render it avoid-
able under section 522. 
This Note rejects the statutory arguments that have been advanced 
in favor of the transformation rule, and argues that the rule is incon-
sistent with both the policies motivating section 522 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the overall purposes of the U.C.C. priority system. Part I 
examines the treatment of purchase money security in the U.C.C. 
scheme. It also describes the exemption provisions of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code and the legislative concerns that shaped those provisions. 
Part II summarizes the judicial adoption of the transformation rule 
and the statutory basis relied upon by courts in applying it. Part III 
argues that neither the statutory language nor the policies underlying 
the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Code justify the transformation rule. 
Part III concludes further that application of the rule will have unfa-
vorable consequences for consumer financing transactions. The Note 
therefore suggests that courts would better serve the interests of both 
debtors and creditors by holding that purchase money security inter-
ests in household goods retain their purchase money character follow-
ing refinancing. 
I. STATUTORY TREATMENT OF PURCHASE 
MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS 
A. The U. C. C. 
Under the U.C.C., either a seller or a lender may acquire a 
purchase money security interest upon a sale of goods on credit. 17 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 5966 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE RE-
PORT]; In re Conn, 16 Banlcr. 454, 456 (Banlcr. W.D. Ky. 1982) ("Although the debtors .•• 
argue that ..• lien avoidance is governed solely by banlcruptcy Jaw, the precondition of lien 
avoidance, nonpurchase money status, derives from state statute."). 
All states but Louisiana have adopted the U.C.C. § 9-107 definition of "purchase money 
security interest," see note 6 supra, as their "local" Jaw. 3 U.L.A. 1-2 (Master ed. 1981). 
15. "The vast majority of courts that have considered the issue ... have held that refinanc-
ing or consolidating loans • . . extinguishes the purchase money character of the original Joan 
..•• " In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1984). 
16. See, e.g., In re Moore, 33 Bankr. 72 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 270 
(Banlcr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Gibson, 16 
Bankr. 257 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
17. Section 9-107 provides that a seller's security interest in collateral is purchase money "to 
the extent that it is •.. taken or retained ... to secure all or part of [the collateral's] price." 
U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1985). A lender acquires a purchase money security interest "to the extent 
that ... by making advances or incurring an obligation [she] gives value to enable the debtor to 
acquire rights in or use of [the] collateral." U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1985). 
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This purchase money security interest, if perfected, 18 gives priority19 
to the claims of a store that sells merchandise on credit, taking the 
item sold as collateral for its price, and to the claims of a bank that 
extends a loan secured by the item to be purchased with the loan 
money.20 
Unlike most security interests, which are perfected only if the cred-
itor files a financing statement,21 purchase money security interests in 
consumer goods are automatically perfected.22 Before passage of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, automatic perfection was the most 
significant difference between purchase money and nonpurchase 
money security interests.23 Typically, the issue arose in a "priority 
battle" between creditors to decide which of them had the better claim 
18. The U.C.C. defines perfection only by designating what steps must be taken to achieve it 
(§ 9·303), but official comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-301 (1985) explains that "the term 'perfected' is 
used to describe a security interest in personal property which cannot be defeated in insolvency 
proceedings or in general by creditors." 
While a perfected security interest is enforceable in bankruptcy as a lien on the specific prop-
erty identified as collateral, see note 19 infra, an unsecured creditor or a creditor holding an 
unperfected security interest will receive only a pro rata share of the bankrupt's estate after its 
liquidation. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 23-5, at 918 ("[A] secured party 
who perfects prior to bankruptcy is likely to have the right to snatch the collateral out of the 
trustee's hands, but an unperfected secured party will invariably have to eat from the general 
creditors' trough in bankruptcy."). In practice, unsecured creditors rarely receive anything upon 
liquidation. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., BANKRUPTCY REFORM Acr OF 
1978-A BEFORE AND AFTER LooK 55 (1983) (Report to the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee). 
19. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1985), which states that "[a] purchase money security interest in 
collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collat-
eral •.. if the purchase money security interest is perfected .... " In bankruptcy, a creditor 
with priority may ordinarily satisfy his entire claim out of the debtor's collateral "before the 
subordinate party satisfies himself to any extent." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-1, at 
1031 (emphasis in original). 
20. See note 17 supra. 
21. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1985) states that "[a] financing statement must be filed to perfect all 
security interests" except in certain listed situations. This requirement establishes the "general 
rule" that perfection of security interests is accomplished by public filing. Official comment 1 to 
U.C.C. § 9-302 (1985); see generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 23-5, at 918 ("By far 
the most common and important method [of perfection] is the filing of a financing statement."). 
A financing statement "contains only enough information to notify a reader that the creditor 
named may claim an interest in described collateral of the debtor named. . . . [N]ormally it is 
merely a publicly filed notice that tells a reader where to hunt for more information." Id. 
22. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (1985) excepts from the general financing statement filing require-
ment "a purchase money security interest in consumer goods." The U.C.C. follows prior prac-
tice in this regard. Automatic perfection spares lenders and the filing system the burden of filing 
interests in goods that other lenders are accustomed not to rely on for security and that, once 
used, would be of only marginal value if taken as collateral. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 
12, § 23-7, at 920. 
Three states - Kansas, Maine, and Oklahoma - do not permit automatic perfection of 
purchase money security interests in consumer goods. Three other states have imposed purchase 
price limitations above which automatic perfection is not allowed: Maryland ($500), Colorado 
($250), and Wisconsin ($250). Id. at 925 n.119. 
23. See, e.g., W.S. Hadcock Corp. v. Banks (Jn re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977) 
(creditor with nonpurchase money security interest loses secured claim because of failure to file a 
financing statement). 
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to the collateral. If a refinanced loan lost its purchase money status 
because of the transformation rule, and the creditor did not perfect her 
security interest by filing a financing statement, the creditor's interest 
would no longer take priority over the security interests held by other 
creditors. 24 
B. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act added new significance to the 
purchase money /non purchase money distinction by allowing debtors 
to avoid nonpurchase money liens on certain household goods. 25 This 
feature of the Bankruptcy Code, embodied in the exemption-and-
avoidance provisions of section 522, is largely attributable to two con-
gressional concerns: (1) securing a meaningful fresh start for the 
debtor, and (2) limiting the impact of abusive credit practices. 
1. The Debtor's Fresh Start 
While the avowed purpose of bankruptcy discharge has always 
been to give the debtor/bankrupt26 a "fresh start,"27 Congress felt that 
achievement of this goal required stronger measures than previous law 
had provided.28 It reasoned that if a debtor's basic household prop-
erty was reclaimed upon bankruptcy by secured creditors, the debtor 
would have to go back into debt immediately after discharge to obtain 
items necessary for ordinary day-to-day living.29 Thus, debtors would 
be denied the opportunity to begin again on a sound, debt free basis. 
Federal bankruptcy law has always permitted debtors to exempt 
certain specified property from being sold to satisfy general creditors' 
24. See, e.g., Associates Fin. v. Conn, 16 Bankr. 454, 456 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (stating 
that "[the] consequence [in pre-Bankruptcy Code cases holding that refinancing transforms 
purchase money status] was the subordination of the creditor's security interest, unperfected for 
lack of proper filing, to the interest of the bankruptcy trustee"). 
25. "Section 522(t) of the Bankruptcy Code has shifted the importance of purchase money 
status from perfection to lien avoidance" by allowing avoidance of only nonpurchase money 
interests. Associates Fin. v. Conn, 16 Bankr. 454, 456 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). 
26. Prior legislation had referred to an individual undergoing liquidation ("straight bank· 
ruptcy") as a "bankrupt," and to one undergoing rehabilitation as a "debtor." The 1978 Act 
uses the term "debtor'' to refer to both, in part to reduce the stigma associated with the use of the 
label "bankrupt." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 310, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 5963, 6267. 
27. The development of the fresh start doctrine is traced in Comment, supra note 13, at 846-
50. 
28. "The two most important aspects of the fresh start available under the Bankruptcy laws 
are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal life, and the discharge, with the 
release from creditor collection attempts. Current law is deficient in both of these areas." 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 125, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 
6086. 
29. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., !st & 
2d Sess. 939-40 (statement of Ernest L. Sarason, Jr., Staff Attorney, the National Consumer Law 
Center, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
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claims.30 Prior to the 1978 Code, however, even exempt property was 
not protected from repossession by anyone holding a secured claim or 
lien against it.31 Congress altered this situation somewhat in the 1978 
Code by allowing debtors to avoid nonpurchase money security inter-
ests in certain items, such as household goods and tools of employ-
ment, that it deemed especially important to debtors. 32 
Some groups and individuals urged that debtors be allowed to 
avoid all security interests in exempt property, or alternatively that 
judges be left with discretion to allow avoidance of purchase money 
interests in individual cases. 33 Rather than make such a radical 
change, however, Congress fashioned an exemption-and-redemption 
scheme that both protected what it considered legitimate purchase 
money interests and strengthened the debtor's fresh start by allowing 
avoidance of nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in 
the exempt property.34 
2. Abusive Creditor Practices 
In strengthening the debtor's fresh start, Congress was especially 
concerned with limiting the effect of overreaching security arrange-
ments in which the debtor assigns as security for a loan the used furni-
ture and household goods he or she already owns and needs for daily 
life. Since used appliances, furniture, and other household goods have 
little monetary value and depreciate rapidly, this type of collateral 
provides little financial security to the lender even when first given as 
collateral. 35 Such goods are relatively expensive to replace, however, 
and are difficult to do without, so that the threat of repossession is a 
singularly effective method of coercing payment from a distressed 
debtor. 36 By drawing the purchase money/ non purchase money dis-
30. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL 
L. REV. 663, 666-67 (1968); Comment, supra note 13, at 847. 
31. See 2 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 910 (1956) (creditor with secured claim on exempt property is entitled to payment in 
full); Hughes, supra note 11, at 1036. 
32. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. See also Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption 
Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REv. 769 (1980). 
Another new feature of the 1978 Code was the provision of a uniform federal exempt-prop-
erty list. Previously, state law had provided the descriptions and dollar limitations on property 
eligible for exemption. See generally Hughes, supra note 11. Under § 522(b), however, states 
may replace the federal list with their own exempt-property statutes. To date, 36 states have 
chosen this option. See note 13 supra. See also Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on 
the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339 (1980); Comment, Exemptions Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code: Using California's New Homestead Law as a Medium for Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. 
REV. 922 (1984) (examining exemptions in California, a state that has opted out of the federal 
exemption scheme). 
33. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 29, at 939-40; note 38 infra. 
34. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
35. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 23-7, at 923 (discussing the effect of rapid 
depreciation of most consumer goods on their value as collateral). 
36. See House Hearings, supra note 29, at 761-62 (statement of David H. Williams, Attorney, 
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tinction in section 522, Congress sought to prevent the use of these 
tactics by creditors while preserving the protection available to lenders 
who finance the acquisition of exempt property.37 
In deciding that purchase money liens would not be avoidable 
under section 522, Congress was acknowledging that there is a qualita-
tive difference between lenders who take security interests in used 
goods merely for the psychological leverage that the threat of reposses-
sion provides, and those who retain security interests in goods that 
they have previously enabled the debtor to purchase.38 Admittedly, 
because household goods depreciate rapidly, a purchase money lender 
will soon be in the same position as a lender who takes a security inter-
est in used goods: the security interest will cease to have much mone-
tary value, and will come to function mostly as a psychologically 
coercive device to force repayment. 39 In recognition of this problem, 
however, Congress enacted a specific safeguard to ensure that non-
avoidable purchase money liens would be limited to their proper 
scope. Section 722 of the new Code gives the debtor an unwaivable 
right to redeem exempt consumer property by paying the lienholder 
the fair market value of the collateral or the amount of the allowed 
claim, whichever is less.40 Thus, if the collateral secured by a 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection) (FTC study shows that virtually all consumer creditors 
took blanket security interests in household necessities, and that the security was used chiefly for 
psychological leverage rather than as grounds for repossession). See also Comment, supra note 
13, at 848-49 (footnotes omitted): 
[A] common technique of creditors was to take security interests in a necessary item, such as 
the debtor's automobile, and then threaten to deprive the debtor of its use by repossession if 
the debtor failed to reaffirm his debt after bankruptcy. By taking such necessary collateral, 
creditors used security interests to obtain bargaining power far in excess of the liquidation 
value of that collateral. 
37. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 5963, 6088. 
38. In testimony before the House, Ernest L. Sarason, Jr., staff attorney for the National 
Consumer Law Center, Inc., voiced approval of the nonpurchase money avoidance power and 
urged that Congress expand the avoidance power to include purchase money interests. He noted 
that the National Commission on Consumer Finance had recommended that creditors not be 
allowed to take nonpurchase money security interests in household goods, and that the Uniform 
Commercial Credit Code and a proposed FTC regulation prohibited most nonpurchase money 
security interests in consumer goods. He went on to say that the Model Consumer Credit Act 
prohibits even purchase money security interests in personal effects, household furnishings, appli· 
ances, and clothing. House Hearings, supra note 29, at 953. 
In response to Mr. Sarason's proposal that § 522(f) exemptions be expanded to allow avoid-
ance of purchase money interests, Rep. Butler commented, "I find it difficult to see how we can 
wipe out the interest of the [purchase money] creditor just arbitrarily because the man has chosen 
to file bankruptcy." Id. at 953. See also note 115 infra. The Model Consumer Credit Act, which 
would "wipe out" purchase money security interests in certain goods, has yet to be entirely 
adopted by any state. 
39. Of course, the goods depreciate just as rapidly for the purchase money secured party as 
they do for the nonpurchase money lender. A notable difference, however, is that the purchase 
money creditor at least starts off with collateral equal in value to the amount of the debt. 
40. The statute states: 
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under 
this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or 
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purchase money lien has depreciated by the time of bankruptcy to the 
point where repossession is of little financial value to the creditor, it 
will be relatively easy for the debtor to redeem the collateral rather 
than allow it to be repossessed.41 
II. THE JUDICIAL GENESIS OF THE TRANSFORMATION RULE 
Courts have derived the transformation rule42 from the definition 
of "purchase money security interest" provided in U.C.C. section 9-
107.43 Section 9-107(b) states that a security interest is purchase 
money to the extent that it is "taken by a person who . . . gives value 
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collat-
eral. . . . "44 The security interest obtained through refinancing does 
not meet this definition, it is argued, because the debtor has already 
obtained rights in the collateral by virtue of a prior credit sale.45 This 
argument thus focuses on the fact that there has been a "new" loan. 
The fact that a previous loan by the same creditor had originally ena-
bled the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral is deemed irrelevant 
to the character of the second loan. 
The transformation rule finds additional support in the last sen-
tence of the second official comment to section 9-107. The comment 
explains that the language of section 9-107(b) is meant to exclude from 
purchase money status "any security interest taken as security for or 
in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt. "46 Courts 
have reasoned that a refinancing is by definition the payment of an 
household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is ex-
empted under § 522 of this title . . . by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the 
allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien. 
11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982). Courts have construed § 722 liberally in favor of debtors. See, e.g., 
Associates Fin. v. Fitzgerald, 20 Banl<r. 27 (Banl<r. N.D.N.Y. 1982). See generally Butler, Sec-
tion 722: A Redeeming Aspect of the Bankruptcy Code, 88 COM. L.J. 462 (1983). 
41. See, e.g., In re Hobdy, 18 Bankr. 70, 75 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (Redemption allows the 
debtor "to retain his necessary property and avoid the high replacement cost that might be re-
quired if the secured creditor repossessed."); see also House Hearings, supra note 29, at 953 
(dialogue between Mr. Parker and Mr. Sarason). Note, however, that if the debtor cannot afford 
to redeem his property, the secured creditor is still entitled to repossess it, even if the debtor has 
paid off most, but not all, of the debt. 
42. That is, the rule that a purchase money security interest loses its purchase money status 
when the obligation underlying it is refinanced. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text. 
43. See note 6 supra. 
44. u.c.c. § 9-107(b) (1985). 
45. See, e.g., In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[The debtors] did not use 
the [refinancing] proceeds to acquire rights in or the use of the piano or stereo. They already 
owned them."). 
46. Comment 2 reads in full: 
When a purchase money security interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a seller, 
he must of course have given present consideration. This section therefore provides that the 
purchase money party must be one who gives value "by making advances or incurring an 
obligation": the quoted language excludes from the purchase money category any security 
interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or antecedent debt. 
Official comment 2 to U.C.C. § 9-107 (1985). 
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antecedent debt and the substitution of a new obligation, different in 
some way from the first.47 Therefore, the "new" security interest cre-
ated by the refinancing cannot be classified as a purchase money 
interest. 
The crucial assumption underlying the transformation rule is that 
a refinancing should be viewed as an entirely new agreement that er-
ases the obligations consolidated into it and creates a new debt and 
new security interest unrelated in character to the refinanced debts. If 
the refinancing is thus characterized as "paying off the old loan and 
extending a new one,"48 then it follows that purchase money status is 
lost, because the refinancing terminates the prior purchase money in-
terest and substitutes a new security interest in the same collateral.49 
The new security interest is nonpurchase money in character because 
it secures, not the purchase money for the collateral, but the repay-
ment of an antecedent debt. 50 
The recent Ninth Circuit case In re Matthews 51 is the first decision 
by a circuit court adopting the transformation rule as described 
above. 52 A detailed consideration of Matthews is valuable because its 
factual situation is typical of those cases in which transformation ques-
tions arise, 53 and because the court makes a superficially persuasive 
argument for the proposition that refinancing automatically termi-
nates purchase money status. 
In Matthews, Transamerica Corporation advanced money to en-
able the debtors to buy a stereo and a piano, and it took a security 
interest in those goods. 54 Approximately a year later, Transamerica 
refinanced the original loan. The refinancing agreement paid insur-
ance charges, reduced the dollar amount of the debtor's monthly pay-
ments, and provided the debtors with a small amount of cash.SS 
47. In adopting the transformation rule, courts have reasoned from the official comments as 
well as from the actual language of§ 9-107. See, e.g, Rosen v. Associates Fin. Servs., 17 Bankr. 
436, 437 (D.S.C. 1982); In re Hobdy, 18 Bankr. 70, 72-73 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Ward, 
14 Bankr. 549, 552 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980). 
48. In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1984). 
49. See text at notes 44-45 supra. 
50. See, e.g., In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980) ("The purpose of the 
renewal note was to pay off the original note, an antecedent debt. The purchase money character 
of the security interest was extinguished when the proceeds from the first renewal note were used 
to satisfy the original note."). 
51. 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984). 
52. Matthews notes that the transformation rule, as articulated in In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980), see note 50 supra, has been adopted by the "vast majority" of bank-
ruptcy courts, as well as by the two federal district courts that have considered the issue. 724 
F.2d at 800-01. 
53. In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 259-61 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981), an opinion deciding six 
consolidated cases, also provides illustrations of the context in which transformation issues are 
raised. 
54. 724 F.2d at 799. The loan was paid directly to the merchants who sold the items. 
55. 724 F.2d at 799. 
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About a year after the refinancing, the debtors filed for bankruptcy. In 
deciding that Transamerica held only an avoidable nonpurchase 
money security interest in the stereo and piano, the court held the 
lender strictly to the form of the refinancing agreement. 56 The court 
went on to emphasize that Transamerica itself had made the decision 
to issue a "new loan," and that Transamerica had described the refi-
nancing not as an extension of payments on the old loan, but as pay-
ment of "net balance due."57 
III. CRmCISM OF THE TRANSFORMATION RULE 
Several bankruptcy courts have declined to follow the reasoning 
that led the Matthews court to adopt the transformation rule, and have 
instead held that refinancing a debt leaves a purchase money security 
interest unchanged. 58 These courts have argued that a refinancing is 
"merely a renewal of a previous obligation"59 and consequently does 
not alter the purchase money status and nonavoidable nature of the 
creditor's security interest. 60 This renewal is distinguished from the 
creation of an entirely new agreement (referred to as a novation). 61 
Whether a refinancing is a renewal or a novation depends largely on 
the extent to which the obligations of the debtor have been changed. 62 
56. The court stated: 
The argument that form should not be elevated over substance has merit in some settings, 
but not here. We are dealing with a statutory scheme that governs the priorities among 
creditors. Purchase money security is an exceptional category in the statutory scheme that 
affords priority to its holder over other creditors, but only if the security is given for the 
precise purpose as defined in the statute. And we should not lose sight of the fact that the 
lender chooses the form. 
724 F.2d at 801. 
57. 724 F.2d at 800 (emphasis added). 
58. See, e.g., In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 
270 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Stevens, 24 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In re 
Chambell, 17 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1982); In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
59. In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). 
60. See, e.g., In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. at 700: 
Though in its form the original note is cancelled, its balance is absorbed into the refinancing 
loan. To the extent of that balance the purchase money security interest taken under the 
original note likewise survives because what is owed on the original note is not eliminated, it 
is merely transferred to, and increased in amount by, another obligation. The refinancing 
changes the character of neither the balance due under the first loan nor the security interest 
taken under it. 
quoting In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 270, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). 
61. A "novation" is the "[s]ubstitution of a new contract, debt or obligation for an existing 
one, between the same or different parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (5th ed. 1979). 
62. See, e.g., In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699, 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) ("In delineating 
between a novation and a renewal, the courts have focused on the degree to which the original 
obligation of the debtor has changed and, to some extent, on any additional consideration which 
was conveyed by the debtor to the creditor."). The intent of the parties may also be relevant 
under state law. In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984), for example, noted that under 
California law a novation does not occur without the express intent of the parties. Matthews 
found that intent, holding that the refinancing documents "unequivocally expressed [Transamer-
ica's] intent to make a new loan 'to pay net balance due.' " 724 F.2d at 801. 
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Thus, where refinancing has resulted only in reduced monthly pay-
ments by the debtor, at a higher interest rate, courts have held that the 
refinancing is a renewal and that the creditor maintains its purchase 
money security interest.63 To hold otherwise, courts have argued, 
would elevate the form of a refinancing transaction over its 
substance. 64 
A. U. C. C. Construction: Intents and Purposes 
Because the Bankruptcy Code adopts state law determinations as 
to whether a security interest is purchase money or nonpurchase 
money, 65 and state law is in almost every instance the U.C.C., 66 courts 
on both sides of the issue look first to the U.C.C. in deciding whether 
to apply the transformation rule. At least one court has felt bound by 
the language ofU.C.C. section 9-107 to adopt the rule regardless of its 
effects. In allowing avoidance of the lender's security interest, the 
court in Rosen v. Associates Financial Services Company 61 stated: 
While such a result may be inequitable, particularly in a situation like 
the present one in which the original purchase money loan was refi-
nanced at the debtor's request and for his convenience, this court feels 
that no other result is possible under the explicit language of [the U.C.C. 
and the Bankruptcy Code].68 
However, the language of section 9-107 is not so unequivocal as to 
compel the transformation rule. 69 If a court considers refinancing a 
transaction in which "what is owed on the original note is not elimi-
nated, [but] is merely transferred to, and increased in amount by, an-
other obligation,"70 then the original debt may survive and retain its 
purchase money character under section 9-107. 
63. See In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699, 701 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) ("A new note given in lieu 
of an existing note between the same parties and for the same indebtedness, even at a higher rate 
of interest and due at a later date, is not given for a new consideration, and, therefore, does not 
constitute a novation.") (quoting First Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Daniel, 701 F.2d 141, 142 
(11th Cir. 1983)). 
64. See, e.g., In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 270, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) ("To follow debt-
ors' contention [that the security interest was transformed into nonpurchase money] would be to 
ignore the substance of the refinancing transaction."). 
65. See note 14 supra. 
66. Id. 
67. 17 Bankr. 436 (D.S.C. 1982). 
68. 17 Bankr. at 438. In Rosen, the debtor purchased appliances with a $2500 loan from a 
finance company; both parties agreed that this gave the company a valid purchase money secur-
ity interest in the appliances. Shortly thereafter, the company extended a loan for approximately 
$3000, secured by the same appliances. The second loan incorporated the balance due under the 
first and also paid the insurance premiums due under several insurance policies. Soon afterwards 
the debtor filed for bankruptcy and claimed the appliances as exempt. 
69. One court, in fact, has explicitly noted that "nowhere in the Uniform Commercial Code 
is it said [that] a purchase money interest is transformable." In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 267 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
70. In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454, 459 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). 
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In the absence of clear statutory language favoring a given inter-
pretation, a court should go behind the words of the statute and ex-
amine the underlying purposes sought to be achieved by its drafters.71 
Indeed, this principle is explicitly mentioned by the drafters of the 
U.C.C. in the comments to the section containing its rules of construc-
tion. Comment 1 to that section first cautions that "the proper con-
struction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be 
limited to its reason,"72 and it then goes on to suggest that even clear 
statutory commands should be ignored if the result they dictate is not 
consistent with the rationale of the statute.73 The Matthews court it-
self acknowledged this need to refer to purpose in interpreting the 
U.C.C.74 
The distinction drawn in section 9-107 between purchase and non-
purchase money security was intended largely as a means for deter-
mining priorities among creditors claiming the same collateral. 75 The 
use of the purchase money distinction in the exemption-and-avoidance 
provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code adds new considerations by 
shifting the focus from priorities among creditors to the determination 
of rights to collateral between a consumer debtor and a lender.76 Since 
the considerations that shaped the provisions of section 9-107 itself are 
71. See F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION l (1953). 
72. Official comment l to U.C.C. § 1-102 (1985). the U.C.C.'s first rule of construction 
commands that the Code be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes 
and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1985). One court rejecting the transformation rule as exces-
sively formalistic has noted that ·~there is no indication in the Comment [to§ 9-107] that§ 9-107 
is not to be construed liberally." In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 270, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Ok. 1983). 
73. The comment applauds courts that "have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy 
where the reason of the limitation did not apply." "Nothing in this Act," the drafters conclude, 
"stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts." Official comment 1 to 
u.c.c. § 1-102 (1985). 
White & Summers argue that interpreting Code language in light of its rationale is "[n]ot 
only . . . more likely to produce results that the drafters intended; it probably also makes for 
more predictability and uniformity in the long run." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 4, at 
18. Uniformity is itself a goal of the U.C.C. See note 93 infra and accompanying text. 
74. The Court recognized the need to elevate substance over form "in some settings," but 
concluded that it was inappropriate to do so in the context of purchase money security interests: 
"We are dealing with a statutory scheme that governs the priorities among creditors. Purchase 
money security is an exceptional category in the statutory scheme that affords priority to its 
holder over other creditors, but only if the security is given for the precise purpose as defined in 
the statute." In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1984). 
The court's concern with the priorities between creditors appropriately reflects the impor-
tance of the transformation rule as regards nonexempt property. See note 24supra and accompa-
nying text. However, this concern is not relevant to a § 522 situation, since the only possible 
results when exempt household goods are at issue are that the debtor will retain the collateral free 
from all liens, or the purchase money creditor will repossess it. In no event will it become avail-
able for satisfaction of other creditors' claims if it has been properly claimed as exempt. 
75. See notes 17-24 supra; see generally Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 1333 (1963) (extensive discussion of the pre-Code case law that shaped the Code's purchase 
money provisions). It was this purpose of governing priorities among creditors that the Mat-
thews court stressed. See note 74 supra. 
76. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text. 
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not the same as those arising in its use under section 522 of the new 
Bankruptcy Code,77 the proper construction of section 9-107 in this 
context should be determined by reference to the broader purposes of 
the U.C.C. 
1. Simplicity, Clarity, Modernity 
The first-listed purpose of the U.C.C. is "to simplify, clarify and 
modernize the law governing commercial transactions. " 78 As a canon 
of construction, this goal calls upon courts to favor interpretations of 
the U.C.C. that are commercially simpler and more efficient.79 As be-
tween creditors and debtors, it is difficult to see how the transforma-
tion rule furthers the goal of simplifying the affairs of either. The 
effect of the rule is to require lenders seeking purchase money protec-
tion to make all subsequent advances in separate instruments, each of 
which creates distinct obligations that lenders and debtors must keep 
track of. 80 By complicating lending transactions, the transformation 
rule imposes on lenders a burden that is required only by a rigid read-
ing of a statute that was meant to be applied flexibly. This burden 
frustrates the U.C.C.'s goals of simplicity and clarity. More impor-
tantly, it does not appear to be justified in the long run by correspon-
77. That is, the U.C.C. drafters were concerned with whether a lender should be able to seize 
secured property to the prejudice of other creditors who had lent money to the debtor. Under 
§ 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, the question is whether an individual's need to retain certain 
property in order to gain a "fresh start" should take precedence over the claims of various classes 
of lenders, including those who made purchase of the property possible. See note 38 supra and 
accompanying text. 
78. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(a) (1985). 
79. Specifically regarding article 9, the official comment to § 9-101 says, "The aim of this 
Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-
day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty." 
Official comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 (1985). 
An example of this goal in practice is the U.C.C.'s provision for automatic perfection of 
purchase money security interests in consumer goods. Automatic perfection spares lenders and 
the filing system the burden of filing notice of one of the most common types of security arrange-
ments. See note 22 supra; see also G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
11 19.4 (1965). 
80. For instance, a lender who wishes to extend payments on an existing note, enable the 
debtor to purchase another item, and extend new cash to the debtor, will not be able to consoli-
date these three actions into one instrument and remain protected. Rather, at least two separate 
instruments will be required. 
White & Summers address the analogous problem that arises under the allocation version of 
the transformation rule when several credit sales are consolidated and the court must decide the 
extent to which each item secures its own price. They suggest that one solution is "to consolidate 
only nickel and dime debt and to isolate big ticket items on separate and distinct accounts." 
They then caution that this solution "may be economically impractical." WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 12, § 23-7, at 922. Even if this approach were practicable, under the Matthews trans-
formation rule it would protect only consolidation refinancings, not time extensions. See note 
124 infra and accompanying text. Professor White's preferred solution - providing contractual 
apportionment of payments - also will not save refinancings under the Matthews version of the 
rule. 
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ding benefits to debtors. 81 
2. Custom and the Understanding of the Parties 
The second-listed purpose of the U.C.C. is "to permit the contin-
ued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and 
agreement of the parties."82 Courts ignore this purpose when they re-
fuse to look beyond the refinancing contract to determine the true na-
ture of the transaction. 83 Courts that apply a technical construction to 
refinancing agreements also ignore U.C.C. section 1-205(3), which 
provides that trade practices "give particular meaning to and supple-
ment or qualify terms of an agreement."84 According to comment 4 of 
section 1-205, the important element in a usage of trade is what the 
language "may fairly be expected to mean to the parties involved in 
the particular commercial transaction .... " 85 Thus, this section 
mandates that courts look beyond the letter of a refinancing agreement 
and inquire into the expectations of the parties to that agreement. 
It is implausible to assume that most consumer debtors ponder 
whether a refinancing will change their lender's interest in their televi-
sion from purchase money to nonpurchase money. Instead, it seems 
reasonable that the natural expectation of a debtor who refinances or 
consolidates a loan is that if the same collateral is on both the old and 
new forms, nothing has changed. 86 
81. In fact, the transformation rule may have a substantial negative impact on debtors as well 
as creditors. See notes 130-40 infra and accompanying text. 
82. u.c.c. § 1-102(2)(b) (1985). 
83. There is ample support in the comments to article 9 for looking beyond the form of the 
transaction. For instance, the comment to§ 9-101 explains that "[u]nder the Article distinctions 
based on form ... are no longer controlling." Instead, "[t]he scheme of the Article is to make 
distinctions ... along functional rather than formal lines." Official comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 
(1985). On the question of whether a given transaction creates a security interest, official com-
ment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-102 (1985) states, "When it is found that a security interest ... was 
intended, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name by which the 
parties may have christened it." In light of this language, it seems incongruous to make purchase 
money status depend on such factors as whether a note is marked "paid" or "paid by renewal." 
84. u.c.c. § 1-205(3) (1985). 
85. Official comment 4 to U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1985). 
86. When a consumer debtor obtains a finance company loan for a new washer and signs a 
security agreement, she probably understands that if she fails to repay the finance company, it 
may come and repossess the washer. (Note that this natural expectation of the seller's or lender's 
right to repossess is not present in the nonpurchase money "contract of adhesion, signed in 
ignorance" that Congress wished to allow the debtor to avoid. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 
14, at 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5963, 6088.) 
If several weeks later the debtor decides that she needs a new dryer as well, she will probably 
go to the same finance company for the new loan. Through various paper adjustments not of 
particular interest to the debtor, the finance company will consolidate her prior loan so that she 
may pay for both appliances on one account. Unless the debtor in question is a bankruptcy 
lawyer who practices in the Ninth Circuit, she will almost certainly expect that her debt on the 
washer remains secured in the same manner as before. As far as the debtor is concerned, the 
consolidation has not changed the nature of the prior transaction; it has merely combined two 
otherwise distinct transactions into one agreement. 
In the case of a time extension rather than a consolidation, it is even more obvious that, from 
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The creditor's reasonable understanding of the refinancing is also 
important to its interpretation.87 Certainly, the creditor can be ex-
pected to be more sophisticated about security interests than the aver-
age debtor. But to the creditor, "the paying of the old note by 
execution of a renewal note is generally just a bookkeeping proce-
dure."88 To the extent that lenders expect to lose purchase money 
status on refinancing, 89 it is because the transformation rule has cre-
ated that expectation. But the U.C.C.'s unifying theme is its subordi-
nation of legal form to the normal (and not the judicially created) 
commercial expectations of the parties to a transaction.90 Justifying a 
formalistic rule by reference to the fact that some lenders have man-
aged to conform their behavior to it is not consonant with this theme. 
In those cases in which the parties actually do intend to extinguish 
their prior obligation and substitute a new one, courts properly can 
find that the refinancing constitutes a novation.91 The search for that 
intent should begin, however, with the substance of the transaction 
and the parties' understanding of it. Under the transformation rule, 
the search for intent begins and ends on the face of the refinancing 
agreement. Such an approach is contrary to proper U.C.C. 
interpretation.92 
3. Uniformity 
The third-listed purpose of the U.C.C. is "to make uniform the law 
among the various jurisdictions.''93 But true uniformity is impossible 
when a statute is interpreted differently in bankruptcy and nonban-
kruptcy contexts, causing the same refinancing to be treated as a new 
obligation for some purposes and as a renewal for others.94 The Mat-
the debtor's standpoint, what is being sought is not a new note or obligation, but an alteration in 
the terms of an existing one. 
87. The Matthews court placed great emphasis on the lender's control over the form of the 
transaction. In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1984); text at note 57 supra. 
88. In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 262 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
89. The Matthews court, for instance, implies that loss of purchase money status was a result 
Transamerica chose in return for bringing the debtors' account current on its books. 724 F.2d at 
800. 
90. The primary spur to the creation of the U.C.C. was the need to modernize the law to 
conform to changing commercial practices. See Shattuck, The Uniform Commercial Code - A 
Modernization of Commercial Law, 35 WASH. L. REV. 398, 398-99 (1960). Article 9 in particu-
lar was designed to allow normal commercial activities to proceed without the danger of pitfalls 
created by technical statutes. Id. at 408. See also Schnader, The Case for the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 77 BANKING L.J. 633, 636 (1960) (prospectus prepared to solicit funds for initial 
drafting of the U.C.C. cited main need for it as the fact that contemporary commercial law was 
not "current with today's business practices"). 
91. See, e.g., In re Averhoff, 18 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982); notes 61-62 supra. 
92. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text. 
93. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c) (1985). 
94. One court, in rejecting the transformation rule, has observed that "[a]bsent specific con-
gressional legislation to the contrary, the rules applicable to priorities in commercial law must be 
consistent whether in the context of bankruptcy or everyday commercial transactions." Jn re 
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thews approach creates a different rule for refinancings than that pre-
vailing outside the bankruptcy courts.95 Even within the bankruptcy 
arena, its treatment of refinanced obligations is inconsistent with the 
approach taken in cases not involving section 522 exemptions. 96 
In nonbankruptcy contexts, the question of whether a refinancing 
is a new contract or a continuation of the previous one often arises 
when a lender refinances a note without filing a new financing state-
ment. If the refinancing constitutes a new advance to pay off the old 
debt, it requires a separate filing for perfection.97 If, however, the refi-
nancing is merely a renewal of a prior obligation, no new filing is re-
quired. 98 In these nonbankruptcy cases courts have followed the 
overwhelming precode presumption that "notes given for notes previ-
ously held [do] not extinguish the original liability."99 The determina-
tive factor is the intent of the parties, 100 and courts assume that a 
refinancing is meant to be the continuation of a prior obligation rather 
than the creation of a new one.101 By following this practice consist-
ently, courts ensure that like transactions will be treated alike under 
the statute. More importantly, by looking to the substance of the 
transaction, the rule ensures that the same refinancing practices will 
not be subject to inconsistent characterizations merely because differ-
ent jurisdictions require different words or procedures. 
Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 267 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). The court went on to note that it could not 
find a single nonbankruptcy case in which purchase money status had been transformed. 
95. See notes 97-101 infra and accompanying text. 
96. See notes 105-08 infra and accompanying text. 
97. Filing is required because the debtor's prior obligation has been extinguished. The credi-
tor must therefore take a new security interest under the new obligation. The general rule is that 
filing is required to perfect that new security interest. See note 21 supra. 
98. If the refinancing is considered a renewal, the debtor's original obligation remains intact. 
Since this obligation is already secured, and the security interest is already perfected, no addi-
tional filing is necessary. 
99. Mid-Eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First Natl. Bank ofS. Md., 455 F.2d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 
1970). The court there held that even the return of the prior notes to the debtor is not conclusive 
on the nature of the refinancing transaction where both parties "understood, at the time the new 
notes were issued, that they were to be merely renewals or extensions of the underlying obliga-
tion." 455 F.2d at 145. See also Index Store Fixture Co. v. Farmers' Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 284, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (refinancing and consolidation "did not in any 
realistic way change the character of the balance due" under the earlier obligation; therefore, 
refinancing did not fall under nonpurchase money limitation in state usury law). Accord Cantrill 
Constr. Co. v. Carter, 418 F.2d 705, 706-07 (6th Cir. 1969); Thorp Fin. Corp. v. Ken Hodgins & 
Sons, 73 Mich. App. 428, 251 N.W.2d 614 (1977); Bank of Austin v. Barnett, 549 S.W.2d 428, 
430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
100. See, e.g., Spector United Employees Credit Union v. Smith, 263 S.E.2d 319, 321 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1980); Bank of Austin v. Barnett, 549 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
101. The general approach was aptly described by one bankruptcy court that held a refinanc-
ing not to be a future advance: "Courts will . . . look behind the evidence of the debt and 
consider the debt itself, and decide according to that. . . . As long as the original debt can be 
traced the security remains, no matter how many renewals there have been." In re McQueen, 27 
Bankr. 717, 722 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983) (quoting Robinson v. Leach, 67 Vt. 128, 129, 31 A. 32, 33 
(1895)) (emphasis omitted). 
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Uniformity is promoted rather than lost when courts reject formal-
istic readings of the U.C.C. and attend instead to the substance of the 
transactions before them and the impact of their decisions on similar, 
future transactions. For instance, courts have apparently never held 
that the assignment of a purchase money note from a seller to a fi-
nance company102 voids the note's purchase money character.103 But 
such a holding would seem to be required by the literal language of the 
U.C.C.; the subsequent holder of the note falls into neither category of 
section 9-107.104 Allowance of purchase money status after assign-
ment can only be explained by reference to the substance of the trans-
action, which remains essentially purchase money in character. It is 
also likely that courts are unwilling to impose gratuitous burdens on 
credit sellers in the name of formal compliance with the U.C.C. By 
their attention to the goals of the U.C.C. and the commercial realities 
of the cases before them, courts have attained uniformity of result even 
without the explicit support of specific statutory language. 
Even within the bankruptcy area, the Matthews approach is incon-
sistent with that taken by many courts in deciding whether refinancing 
agreements are properly characterized as entirely new obligations. 
For instance, several courts have upheld the validity of refinancing 
agreements against arguments that the refinancings constituted future 
advances105 or preferences.1°6 Others have similarly held that loans 
for the purchase of exempt property made before the effective date of 
the 1978 Code but refinanced after could not be avoided because the 
security interests related back in time to the original loan and retained 
their original purchase money character.107 One of these courts sum-
marized the state of the law as follows: "Synthesizing these cases, it 
102. This type of arrangement is often called "factoring," which is defined as the "[s]ale of 
accounts receivable of a firm to a factor at a discounted price." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 
(5th ed. 1979). Factoring enables relatively small merchants to make credit sales and still main· 
tain cash flow at viable levels. "[W]hen a purchaser on credit signs an installment note to the 
seller ... , the note is usually 'negotiated' to a sales finance company or bank." U.S. DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, CONSUMER CREDIT: FACTORS INFLUENCING ITS AVAILABILITY AND COST 11 
(1976). 
103. See Gilmore, supra note 75, at 1373; In re Hobdy, 18 Bankr. 70, 73 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 
1982) ("There is little, if any, case law which provides insight into this matter. In the several 
cases involving similar matters, the continued status of a purchase money security interest after 
assignment is assumed."). 
104. The factor is not a seller and therefore cannot fall under§ 9-107(a); nor has the factor-
ing arrangement given value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral, as§ 9-107(b) 
demands. The first comment to§ 9-107, however, assumes without explanation the continuation 
of pre-U.C.C. practice by providing that "a financing agency has a purchase money security 
interest when it advances mom:y to the seller, taking back an assignment of chattel paper." Qffi. 
cial comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-107 (1985). 
105. See note 99 supra and accompanying text; Blue v. H-K Corp., 629 P.2d 790 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1981) (holding that a refinancing was not a future advance and that the security interest 
remained unchanged). 
106. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank of Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 1967) (hold-
ing that a refinancing is a renewal, and not a preference, if the debtor's estate is undiminished). 
107. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Daniel, 701 F.2d 141 (11th Cir. 1983); 111 re 
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becomes clear, excepting the effect of [section] 522{f), that when notes 
are renewed or consolidated or renewed coupled with the granting of 
additional credit, cash advances or collateral, the original note and 
security interest are not extinguished, unless the parties manifest such 
an intention."108 
One of the principal goals of the U.C.C. is to create uniformity 
from state to state. 109 When Congress used U.C.C. terminology in the 
Bankruptcy Code it meant to extend this uniformity so that similar 
transactions would be treated alike whether the question at hand arose 
in bankruptcy proceedings or in nonbankruptcy litigation.110 By es-
tablishing a formal rule based on an anomalous reading of the U.C.C., 
the Matthews court has destroyed this uniformity. 
B. The Transformation Rule and the Policies of the Bankruptcy Act 
In addition to being inconsistent with the purposes of the U.C.C., 
the transformation rule ignores the judgments that Congress embodied 
in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, the effect of the rule is to 
erode the distinction between purchase money and nonpurchase 
money interests, a distinction that Congress sought to preserve. The 
rule also threatens to curtail purchase money lending and refinancing, 
a result that Congress explicitly sought to avoid. 
1. Preservation of the Purchase Money/Nonpurchase Money 
Distinction under the Bankruptcy Code 
Congress designed the exemption and avoidance provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code to strike a balance between debtors' need for protec-
tion from abusive creditor tactics and creditors' need for security in 
legitimate household-goods purchase transactions. The purpose of the 
avoidance provisions of the Act is to permit debtors to retain used 
household goods that the creditor did not help the debtor to acquire. 
Congress intended by these provisions to prevent creditors from ob-
taining undue influence over debtors by threatening to repossess neces-
sary items.111 The purpose of limiting the avoidance option to 
nonpurchase money interests was to protect those lenders whose credit 
had enabled the debtor to acquire the collateral in the first place.112 
Thus, the purchase money /nonpurchase money distinction in section 
522 is the key to the legislative balance between debtors' and creditors' 
rights in exempt property. 
Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 262 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); see also Blue v. H-K Corp., 629 P.2d 790 
(Okla. Ct. App. 1981). 
108. In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 263 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). 
109. See text at note 93 supra. 
110. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
111. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
112. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. 
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The usual effect of the transformation rule, however, is to ignore 
this distinction by treating refinanced purchase money debts and ordi-
nary loans secured by presumptively abusive security agreements in 
the same way merely because of the manner in which the purchase 
money lender has chosen to proceed. For example, if a lender extends 
purchase money in one transaction and later makes a cash advance to 
the debtor in an entirely separate transaction, the indisputably correct 
result is that the first security interest will not be avoidable, but the 
one taken in the second transaction will. Similarly, in one instrument 
a lender may extend two sums of money, one to be used to purchase a 
television set and the other to pay a utility bill. The security interest in 
the television will be unavoidable to the extent that its price has not 
been repaid.113 Yet under the transformation rule, if the lender ex-
tends money to enable the purchase of the television, then later ex-
tends money to pay the utility bill under a contract consolidating the 
television debt, the debtor will be able to avoid the security interest in 
the television. The result, then, is that avoidance depends entirely on 
the timing and form of the agreements. 
Congress, however, intended to make avoidance depend on the 
nonpurchase money character of the creditor's security interest, 114 not 
on its form or timing. In so doing, it was giving a special status in 
bankruptcy to lenders or sellers whose credit had enabled the debtor 
to obtain exempt household goods. 115 By extinguishing purchase 
money status, the transformation rule ignores the critical distinction 
drawn by Congress between lenders who have enabled debtors to ac-
quire goods and those who have lent money and taken used goods as 
collateral. 
Absent some compelling policy disfavoring refinancing, purchase 
money lenders should be permitted to retain the protections of 
purchase money status to the extent that the original purchase price of 
the secured goods remains unpaid. Not only is there no policy justifi-
cation for disfavoring refinancing, there are compelling reasons to 
favor purchase money lending in general and refinancing in 
113. This is only true, however, if the instrument itself limits the security interest to the price 
of the collateral, or if courts reject the argument that purchase money status is lost if the collnt· 
eral acts as security for more than its purchase price. See note 9 supra. Rejection of that argu-
ment would seem to be mandated by U.C.C. § 9-107 (1985), which states that a security interest 
is purchase money "to the extent that" it secures its own price. However, some courts have held 
otherwise. See In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1975) (purchase money character of 
security interest is lost if security interest secures more than the price of the collateral). 
114. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
llS. One court has found it "clear that Congress did not intend a debtor to avoid n lien 
which he granted in order to purchase the property in the first instance." In re Moore, 33 Bankr. 
72, 74 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1983). See also In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 270, 274 (Bankr. W.D. Okin. 
1983) ("Congress enacted 522(t) not for the purpose of permitting the consumer debtor to avoid 
security interest [sic] in collateral which was purchased by the money advanced but rather its 
purpose was to permit avoidance of security interests in already owned, household goods."). 
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particular.116 
2. The Effect of the Transformation Rule on 
Consumer Transaction Financing 
129 
The transformation rule threatens to affect financing transactions 
in two ways. First, the rule may force some lenders to restrict credit 
and thereby hamper consumer access to exempt goods. 117 Consumer 
transactions are promoted when creditors are able to take and main-
tain purchase money security interests in the goods purchased. As one 
court has observed, "purchase money security interests are not given 
preferred status to benefit only the creditor. Rather, '[t]he purchase 
money priority rule encourages the acquisition of new assets by the 
debtor.' " 118 Transformation of purchase money status therefore 
threatens to restrict the amount of credit available. To the extent that 
lenders rely on the extra protection of purchase money status in ex-
tending loans, they will be reluctant to make loans - at least on com-
parable terms - to those consumers likely to request refinancing.119 
More often mentioned is the prospect that the transformation rule 
will discourage refinancing. This is the second effect the rule will have 
on financing transactions: lenders who do make purchase money 
loans will be reluctant to refinance them, preferring instead to resort to 
the very remedies that the Bankruptcy Act sought to avoid.120 The 
Matthews court asserted that "[l]enders will not be discouraged from 
116. On the desirability of purchase money financing, see, e.g., Pristas v. Landaus of Ply-
mouth, Inc., 742 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1984) (U.C.C. "gives favored treatment to [purchase 
money] financing arrangements on the theory they are beneficial both to buyers and sellers"). On 
the importance of refinancing to keep debtors out of bankruptcy, see note 140 infra. 
117. It has been suggested that any decrease in creditors' rights may result in a restriction of 
credit to compensate for the increased risk. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 1, at 114: "In the 
face of limitations on remedies a creditor can either (1) increase rates to cover added collection 
costa [sic] and bad debt losses or (2) maintain the same rates but exercise more selectivity in 
granting credit. . . . Both will result in reduced availability." See also note 137 infra. 
118. In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 265 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (quoting McLaughlin, supra 
note 9). The implication is that lenders will make purchase money credit available for purchases 
for which they would not extend loans absent the additional protection of purchase money 
status. 
119. Refinancing occurs in a large percentage of consumer credit arrangements. See House 
Hearings, supra note 29, at 761. 
120. Of course, it is not necessarily bad to discourage creditors from refinancing the debts of 
already over-extended consumers, especially if those consumers want the refinancing to include 
new loans for further acquisitions. However, refinancing existing debt without allowing new 
acquisitions is an option which is often superior to a demand for payment on schedule, which 
may result in bankruptcy. Note that a purchase money lender who suspects that a debtor is 
likely to default has little to lose by threatening the debtor with repossession. Either the debtor 
will pay the amount due, or the threats will force him to declare bankruptcy. If the debtor files 
for bankruptcy, the lender who has refused to refinance at least retains his purchase money 
priority and may reclaim the collateral; a lender whose interest has been transformed by refinanc-
ing will usually receive nothing in liquidation. See notes 18-19 supra. 
It may be argued that a consumer debtor is unlikely to declare bankruptcy, and a consumer 
creditor is unlikely to file an involuntary petition, over the kinds of small debts covered by 
§ 522(!). However, there is always the prospect that some debtors may be forced into bank-
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refinancing under the rule. The lender can just as easily extend pay-
ments under the old loan as well as issue a new loan."121 Other courts, 
however, have disagreed. 122 
At the outset, it is unclear what the Matthews court would con-
sider a proper extension of payments. In responding to Transamer-
ica's argument that its refinancing constituted a renewal, the Matthews 
court relied partly on a California case characterizing a refinancing as 
a novation because "the new obligation had a different maturity date 
and a different rate of interest from the original loan."123 It is not 
evident how the extension of time contemplated in Matthews differs in 
this regard: any refinancing will be evidenced by a separate piece of 
paper bearing a different date, and any refinancing will alter the terms 
of the original obligation in some way.124 Indeed, if neither the matur-
ity date nor the interest rate is changed, there is no reason to refinance. 
Uncertainty about the scope of the transformation rule, and the pros-
pect of inconsistent interpretations of the rule in different jurisdictions, 
can only serve to magnify lenders' reluctance to refinance. 
Apart from uncertainty as to time-extension refinancings, the pos-
sibility of avoiding the transformation rule by extending payments on 
existing accounts rather than issuing new notes may not prove satis-
factory. Consolidation refinancings will still lose purchase money sta-
tus under the rule. Consequently, lenders will have to isolate different 
accounts with the same debtor and treat them separately. This addi-
tional burden would have at least some impact, especially on small 
lenders. 125 
Even assuming that time-extension refinancings fall outside the 
Matthews transformation rule, 126 it still does not follow that lenders 
can escape the rule's harmful effects. Time extensions would leave the 
ruptcy by a creditor who fears that refinancing will be followed by bankruptcy and, for him, a 
financially inferior distribution of the debtor's assets. 
121. In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 801 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). 
122. See, e.g., In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699, 701 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Strictly applying 
the Transformation Rule would yield the undesirable result of discouraging creditors from refi-
nancing consumer loans."). 
123. 724 F.2d at 801. The Matthews court was referring to Childs v. Stocker-LaBrea Proper-
ties, 9 Cal. App. 3d 276, 88 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1970). In Childs, the California Court of Appeals held 
that a note given to pay interest due under prior notes secured by real property was not itself 
secured by real property. While the court mentioned that the maturity dates and interest rates 
differed, it first observed that the original notes were explicitly secured by 11 trust deed but were 
not guaranteed, while the note given to pay interest on the original notes did not indicate any renl 
property as security, but did bear personal guarantees. Although the note in issue wns one con-
solidating two separate notes given to pay interest, this fact seems to have played no part in the 
court's decision. 
124. In In re Gayhart, 33 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983), for example, the court nc-
knowledged that a strict application of the transformation rule would invalidate the simple time-
extension refinancing at issue there. Although refusing to reject the rule, it declined to apply it in 
that case because of its "unintended and inequitable results." 33 Bankr. nt 700. 
125. See note 80 supra. 
126. See notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text. 
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lender with a delinquent account on the books, 127 a situation lenders 
seek to avoid. 128 Lenders will therefore resist this approach, especially 
in light of the uncertainty as to what form of refinancing would sur-
vive under a strict application of Matthews. 129 
Lenders thus must choose between refusing to refinance and refi-
nancing and losing purchase money status.130 The former option is 
unsatisfactory to debtors because it accelerates the very repossession 
process Congress wished to forestall, 131 and because it may well result 
in bankruptcies that could otherwise have been avoided.132 It is also 
unsatisfactory to lenders, who would rather have a solvent debtor. 133 
The latter solution - that of refinancing and losing purchase money 
priority134 - is unsatisfactory because lenders as a group will compen-
sate for their increased economic exposure by making credit both 
more difficult and more expensive to obtain.135 In addition, the debtor 
typically would gain little more than the extension of time and the 
reduction of payments that would have been freely given in the ab-
sence of the transformation rule. Of course, in a subsequent bank-
ruptcy, the debtor is advantaged by the fact that she may avoid the 
lender's transformed security interest and retain her exempt property. 
However, the gain is comparatively small, since under section 722 the 
debtor would have been able to limit the effect of the security interest 
even if that interest had retained its purchase money status.136 
The transformation rule thus imposes burdens on both lenders and 
debtors that are not otherwise present. It gives the lender two options, 
127. The Matthews court noted that by writing a new note, Transamerica "converted a delin-
quent loan into a current loan on its books." 724 F.2d at 800. The court concluded that the loss 
of purchase money status was the price Transamerica had decided to pay for this benefit. 
128. Lenders try to avoid carrying delinquent accounts on their books because a high per-
centage of past-due accounts is thought to indicate bad credit management and to demonstrate 
the need for more selectivity in granting credit. See Cole, supra note 1, at 495-96. A retailer 
who wishes to negotiate her accounts receivable to a sales finance company will also receive less if 
her books show a large number of delinquent accounts. 
129. See text following note 124 supra. 
130. Other creditor options, such as garnishment, may not be adequate to safeguard the 
creditor's financial stake, and may, indeed, have consequences for the debtor as bad as or worse 
than either repossession or bankruptcy. See generally S. RlESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 177-83 (1967). 
131. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. 
132. See note 140 infra. 
133. Lenders would prefer to have a solvent debtor who continues to make payments but at a 
slower rate. As the Matthews court acknowledged, "[n]either party desires default." In re Mat-
thews, 724 F.2d 798, 801 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). Of course, lenders are injured when they are forced 
to extend the time for paywents. See note 128 supra. However, lenders will ordinarily prefer to 
accept delinquent payments rather than repossess depreciated consumer goods. See note 35 
supra and accompanying text. 
134. This is the solution that the Matthews court envisioned for lenders who do not wish to 
carry delinquent accounts on their books. See note 127 supra. 
135. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text. 
136. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text. 
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neither of which is as satisfactory to both parties as the simple solution 
of retaining purchase money status after refinancing. The lender's 
most likely response is to restrict credit to compensate for its dimin-
ished security position.137 This may be done either by diminishing 
the number of loans made initially138 or by restricting refinanc-
ings.139 In a system whose first goal is to keep debtors out of bank-
ruptcy, neither result is desirable.140 To the extent that Congress 
wishes to affect lending practices outside of the bankruptcy context, 141 
the bankruptcy laws are a clumsy and inappropriate vehicle. If courts 
wish to affect lenders' actions by means of the bankruptcy laws, ma-
137. This and a number of other possible creditor responses, including taking greater security 
and raising interest rates, are discussed in White, The Recent Erosion of the Secured Creditor's 
Rights Through Cases, Rules and Statutory Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 Miss. L.J. 389, 417-
29 (1983). 
There is evidence that lenders reacted to the increase in bankruptcy petitions that followed 
enactment of the 1978 Code by cutting back sharply on consumer credit. See CREDIT RE· 
SEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, 
CONSUMERS' RIGHT TO BANKRUPTCY: ORIGINS AND EFFEcrs (1982) (the "Purdue Study"). 
Some states attributed this rise to the new, more liberal federal exemptions and opted out of the 
federal scheme. See, e.g., JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION OF PENNSYLVANIA, BANK· 
RUPTCY EXEMPTIONS 11-12 (1982); see also note 13 supra. The Purdue study's methodology 
and objectivity have been seriously questioned, however, see Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 
Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 
1091, as has the link between any increase in filings and the new exemptions, see Woodward & 
Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 51 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 53 (1983). 
138. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text. 
139. See notes 120-29 supra and accompanying text. 
140. Refinancing an old debt or extending a new advance may well allow the debtor to re-
main solvent. In fact, a report sponsored by the Office of Consumer Affairs recommends refi-
nancing and extending payments as responsible practices that lenders should undertake when 
possible. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CREDIT & FINANCIAL 
ISSUES: RESPONSIVE BUSINESS APPROACHES TO CONSUMER NEEDS 15 (1981). The impor-
tance of refinancing is illustrated by one study suggesting that unexpected medical expenses are a 
major cause of bankruptcy. See Personal Bankruptcy: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97 Cong., 1st & 2d 
Sess. 68-69 (1981-82) (statement of Philip Shuchman, author of the "Connecticut Study"). The 
same study showed that most debtors were employed when they filed for bankruptcy. Id., at 66. 
These results imply that a rescheduling of existing debt, possibly coupled with an advance that 
pays the unexpected medical bills and effectively consolidates them with the preexisting debt, 
would be a realistic way for the debtor to remain out of bankruptcy. On the other hand, if either 
the creditor holding the outstanding debt or the medical provider elects to sue the defaulting 
debtor, bankruptcy is likely; almost half of the debtors studied had been involved in lawsuits 
prior to bankruptcy. Of these, over half were consumer credit suits, and another quarter were for 
unpaid medical expenses. Id. The impact of a consumer credit suit is especially severe because 
virtually all consumer credit contracts contain acceleration clauses that make the entire debt due 
on default. See G. GILMORE, supra note 79, U 43.4, at 1195. 
The Connecticut Study findings are consistent with another study that found medical ex-
penses and prior debt consolidation to be the reasons most often given for personal loans. See 
FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY, supra note l, at 80. 
141. There is no evidence that this was their intent in passing the bankruptcy laws, especially 
since those federal laws dealing directly with consumer credit have carefully protected purchase 
money financing security. See, e.g., FTC Trade Regulation on Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 444.2(a)(3) (1985). 
October 1985] Note - Transformation Rule 133 
nipulation of U.C.C. categories is an even more inappropriate tool. 142 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the language of the U.C.C. nor the policies of the U.C.C. 
or the Bankruptcy Code support the transformation rule. The rule as 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit discourages both lending and refinanc-
ing, and needlessly complicates consumer credit transactions. The 
better rule assumes that refinancing does not change the character of a 
security interest unless a clear intent to the contrary is shown. 
- Raymond B. Check 
142. The U.C.C. specifically "does not prescribe regulations and controls which may be nec-
essary to curb abuses arising in the small loan business or in the financing of consumer purchases 
on credit." Note to U.C.C. § 9-102, 3 U.L.A. 77 (1981). This was a thoroughly debated decision 
on the part of the drafters, who ultimately intended to leave this type ofregulation to other, more 
specific statutes. See GILMORE, supra note 79, 1f 9.2, at 293. 
